1	NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE		
2 3	APPROVAL OF THE AF	PPELLATE DIVISION	
3 4 5		SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION	
6		DOCKET NO. A- 0886- 03T3	
7	MILLVILLE BOARD OF		
8	EDUCATI ON,		
9	A		
10 11	Appel l ant,		
12	v.		
12	•.		
14 15	NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,		
16 17	Respondent.		
18 19			
20 21	BOARD OF EDUCATION OF	DOCKET NO. A-1481-03T3	
22 23	PEMBERTON TOWNSHIP,		
24 25	Appellant,		
26 27	v.		
28 29 30	NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,		
31 32	Respondent.		
33 34			
35 36	PHILLIPSBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION,	DOCKET NO. A-1482-03T3	
37 3 <b>8</b>	Appellant,		
39 40	v.		
41	NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF		
42 43	EDUCATI ON,		
44	Respondent.		
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1 2 3	NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF DOCKET NO. A-1483-03T3 EDUCATION,	
3 4	EDUCATION,	
5 6	Appel l ant,	
0 7 8	v.	
9 10	NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,	
11 12 13	Respondent.	
14 15 16	Argued February 10, 2004 - Decided March 12,	
17 18	2004	
19 20	Before Judges Skillman, Wells and Fisher.	
21 22	On appeal from Department of Education.	
23 24	Richard E. Shapiro argued the cause for appellants, Board of Education of Pemberton	
25 26	Township, Phillipsburg Board of Education and Neptune Township Board of Education.	
27 28	Robinson & Andujar, attorneys for appellant,	
29	Millville Board of Education (Arnold	
30 31	Robinson, on the brief).	
32	Michele Lyn Miller, Deputy Attorney General	
33 34	argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General; Nancy Kaplen,	
35	Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;	
36	Kimberly Lake Franklin and Michael C.	
37 38	Walters, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).	
39		
40	The opinion of the court was delivered by	
41 42	FI SHER, J. A. D.	
42 43	FIGHER, J.A.D.	
44	These consolidated appeals require this court to consider	
45	whether preschool programs required by <u>Abbott v. Burke</u> , 153 <u>N.J.</u>	

1 480 (1998) (Abbott V) must be funded exclusively by the State. 2 The Commissioner of Education concluded that neither the Supreme Court's mandating of preschool programs in Abbott V, nor the 3 Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004, L. 2003, c. 122, 4 5 requires exclusive State funding. Instead, the Commissioner 6 determined that the Supreme Court has only directed that he "ensure" that there be adequate funding for these programs, thus 7 permitting the utilization of local district funds. 8 We agree 9 with the Commissioner and affirm.

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12 Funding for preschool education in the Abbott districts 13 starts with the approval by the Department of Education (DOE) of a budget based on the district's demonstrated need. 14 The DOE then calculates the State aid available. 15 The two components of State aid for preschool are Early Childhood Program Aid (ECPA) 16 17 and Abbott Preschool Expansion Aid (PSEA). ECPA is based upon a formula contained in N.J.S.A. 18A: 7F-16, while PSEA is the 18 19 amount obtained by subtracting the 2002-03 approved preschool 20 plan from the 2003-04 approved plan. The difference between the 21 approved budget for the 2003-04 preschool plan for these

districts, and the ECPA and PSEA State aid components,
 constitute the funds at issue in these matters.<sup>1</sup>

3 Each of the appellants filed appeals challenging the DOE's calculation of their PSEA awards for the year 2003-04. The 4 appeal of the Phillipsburg Board of Education (Phillipsburg) was 5 6 the first of these four matters to reach disposition. The 7 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered a summary decision, determining that the DOE correctly calculated the PSEA due 8 9 The ALJ, however, also found that because the Phillipsburg. 10 combination of PSEA and ECPA was insufficient to fund the entire 11 approved preschool budget, the State was required to provide the 12 shortfall.

The other Abbott districts -- Pemberton, 13 Millville and 14 Neptune -- agreed to stipulate to the essential facts and relied on the arguments raised and considered in the Phillipsburg 15 The ALJs in those matters reached similar results, thus 16 matter. 17 collectively imposing upon the State the obligation to fund the shortfall in each of these districts, namely, 18 \$835,034 in 19 Phillipsburg, \$424,569 in Pemberton, \$1,763,866 in Millville, 20 and \$3, 768, 176 in Neptune.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In the Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, <u>L.</u> 2002, <u>c.</u> 38, Legi sl ature provi ded the PSEA in the total amount of \$142, 400, 000. The Appropriations Act for Fi scal Year 2004 provided the same amount, L. 2003, c. 122, even though only \$112, 400, 000 of the 2003 PSEA was expended.

1 The DOE filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education 2 who, in final decisions rendered in each matter on September 25, 3 2003, rejected the ALJ's conclusions that the State was 4 obligated to exclusively fund these shortfalls. The Commissioner 5 explained that

6 "[F]ull fundi ng" of Abbott preschool 7 programs cannot be viewed as promises or expectations 8 of dollar-for-dollar State funding regardless of resources available in 9 the local district budget. 10 Rather, they must be understood as reflections of the 11 12 Department's commitment, and recognition of 13 its obligation, provi de or to secure 14 additional State funds to the full degree 15 necessary to support approved programs where local budgetary resources, including formula 16 17 local levies and monies ai ds. real i zed 18 through economi es. efficiencies and 19 reallocations, are found inadequate for this 20 purpose.

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22 Because the Commissioner concluded that the fulfillment of his 23 obligation to "ensure" adequate funding for preschool in the 24 Abbott districts permitted the allocation of local tax levies 25 and other local budgetary resources to those purposes, these 26 four Abbott districts seek our review of the Commissioner's 27 decision.

Since the parties do not further dispute the PSEA calculations, the sole question before this court is whether the Commissioner may look to the district's funds, in whole or in part, to bear the shortfall or whether, as the Abbott districts

argue, the burden for the payment of these funds rests
 exclusively upon the State. Resolution of this issue turns on
 an understanding of the Supreme Court's prior holdings and the
 Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004, <u>L.</u> 2003, <u>c.</u> 122 (the
 Appropriations Act).

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## Π

In considering whether the Court's prior decisions require 8 9 the State to bear alone the shortfall existing after the 10 application of the PSEA and ECPA components, we start with the 11 the constituti onal mandate recognition that that the 12 "Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 13 thorough and efficient system of free public schools" is 14 expressly limited to "the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. Const. 15 16 art. VIII, §4, ¶1. Since the issue presented involves the 17 extent of State funding for the education of three- and four-18 year olds in the Abbott districts, an area of education arguably 19 beyond the scope of the constitutional mandate, we are required 20 to carefully examine the Court's mandate in Abbott V and the 21 backdrop against which it was rendered.

22 Holding that the Legislature had failed to remedy the 23 constitutional violations previously found with regard to the

thorough and efficient education promised by the State for 1 children between the ages of five and eighteen,<sup>2</sup> the Court in 2 3 Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145 (1997) (Abbott IV) remanded the matter to the Chancery Division, and temporarily assigned Judge 4 Michael Patrick King, P.J.A.D., to the Chancery Division, to 5 6 examine potential remedies. Adhering to the Supreme Court's 7 mandate, the Commissioner provided his recommendations to Judge 8 King.

9 The Commissioner proposed that "whole-school reform" be 10 adopted in the Abbott districts. Whole-school reform constitutes 11 "a comprehensive approach to education that fundamentally alters 12 the way in which decisions about education are made." Abbott V, 13 153 N. J. **494**. In following Judge King's supra, at recommendations in this regard, the Court acknowledged that, in 14 his own recommendations, the Commissioner had clearly set his 15 16 sights on meeting the "State's strong commitment to implementing 17 whole-school reform, "id. at 497, an approach which

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integrat[es] reform throughout the school as a total institution rather than by simply adding reforms piecemeal. If carried out successfully, whole-school reform affects

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In <u>Abbott IV</u>, the Court held the Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA), <u>N.J.S.A.</u> 18A: 7F-1 to -34, to be unconstitutional, finding that CEIFA did not assure funding parity with the wealthier districts and failed to fully provide for the special needs of Abbott students. 149 <u>N.J.</u> at 176-77, 185-86. <u>See Abbott V</u>, <u>supra</u>, 153 <u>N.J.</u> at 492.

the culture of the entire school, including and curri cul um. instruction. assessment. 3 The reform covers educati on from the 4 earliest levels, including pre-school, and can be particularly effective in enabling the disadvantaged children in poor urban communities to reach hi gher educati onal standards.

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[Id. at 494.]

11 The Court emphasized that "early childhood education is 12 essential for children" in the Abbott districts. Id. at 502. 13 Because early childhood education formed "an integral component of whole-school reform," and considering also that the parties 14 15 had expressed "no fundamental disagreement over the importance of pre-school education, "<sup>3</sup> the Court required the systematic 16 17 implementation of whole-school reform in the Abbott districts, 18 id. at 502-03, and set forth "the remedial measures that must be 19 implemented in order to ensure that public school children from 20 the poorest urban communities recei ve the educati onal 21 entitlements that the Constitution guarantees them, " id. at 489.

In requiring this and the other remedies enunciated in 22 Abbott V, the Court left unresolved the question of whether the 23 24 constitutional guarantee encompasses a thorough and efficient 25 pre-school education for children ages three and four, but

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The Court also observed that in enacting CEIFA, the Legislature had "recognized the necessity of early childhood education for three- and four-year olds in the poorest school districts." <u>Abbott V</u>, <u>supra</u>, 153 N.J. at 505.

concluded that it was "convinced" that preschool was essential
 for preparing children for the education promised by our
 Constitution upon their reaching the age of five:

4 This Court is convinced that pre-school for three- and four-year olds will have a 5 6 significant and substantial positive impact 7 on academic achievement in both early and 8 school years. the later As experts 9 the long-term benefits described, amply 10 justify this investment. Also, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that. in 11 12 the poor urban school districts, the earlier 13 chi l dren start pre-school, the better prepared they are to face the challenges of 14 kindergarten and first grade. It is this 15 year-to-year improvement that is a critical 16 17 condition for the attainment of a thorough and efficient education once a child enters 18 regular public school. 19

21 Stated conversely, because the absence early educational 22 of such intervention 23 del eteri ousl v undermi nes educati onal 24 performance once the child enters public 25 school. the provision of pre-school education also has strong constitutional 26 27 underpinning.

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[<u>Id.</u> at 506-07.]

Thus, while recognizing a link between preschool education and the thorough and efficient education of children between the ages of five and eighteen, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue. <u>Ibid.</u> Instead, the Court concluded that the requirement that preschool be made available in the Abbott districts was a remedy necessarily imposed to redress the prior constitutional deprivation of a thorough and efficient education

1 for children in the Abbott districts upon reaching the age of 2 five. <u>Id.</u> at 489. In short, the Court crafted its requirement 3 that preschool education be provided in the Abbott districts as 4 "a remedial measure that can create the opportunity to achieve a 5 thorough and efficient education." <u>Id.</u> at 501.

6 Since we are satisfied that the Court's <u>Abbott</u> holdings do 7 not include a mandate for the exclusive state funding of 8 preschool, we likewise need not consider whether the scope of 9 the thorough and efficient education clause extends beyond its 10 stated age boundaries, particularly when contemplating the 11 enormity of such a holding beyond the Abbott districts.

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## III

14 We conclude, as did the Commissioner, that the adoption of whole-school reform, with its inclusion of preschool education 15 16 in the Abbott districts, was designed by the Court as a remedy 17 for the past constitutional deprivation of a thorough and 18 efficient education for children between the ages of five and 19 eighteen in the Abbott districts. In so recognizing the nature 20 of Abbott V's mandate, and in comparing that mandate with others 21 rendered by the Court in this context, we also conclude that the 22 Court did not intend to require exclusive state funding of preschool in the Abbott districts. 23

1 In this vein, we observe that the Court has chosen quite 2 emphatic language when exclusive State funding was intended. 3 See Abbott V, supra, 153 N.J. at 524 ("We conclude that any funding formula that does not fund the complete cost of 4 remediating the infrastructure and life cycle deficiencies that 5 6 have been identified in the Abbott districts or that does not 7 fully fund the construction of any new classrooms needed to correct capacity deficiencies will not comport with the State's 8 9 constitutional mandate to provide facilities adequate to ensure 10 a thorough and efficient education."); Abbott v. Burke, 164 N.J. 11 84, 88 (2000) (Abbott VIII) ("The State is required to fund all 12 of the costs of necessary facilities remediation and 13 construction in the Abbott districts.").

14 Here. in requiring preschool programs in the Abbott 15 districts remediate the prior deprivation of the to 16 constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education for 17 children between the ages of five and eighteen, the Court's 18 directives take on a less mandatory tone. Instead of compelling 19 State funding for the implementation of all preschool programs 20 included within whole-school reform, the Court simply imposed an obligation on the Commissioner to "ensure" that such funding is 21 22 provi ded:

23In directing the implementation of pre-24school programs in the Abbott schools, the

Commissioner must ensure that such programs 1 2 are adequately funded and assist the schools 3 in meeting the need for transportation and 4 other servi ces, support, and resources The Commissioner 5 related to such programs. 6 may authorize cooperation with or the use of 7 chi l dhood and existing early day-care programs in the community. 8 9

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[<u>Abbott V</u>, <u>supra</u>, 153 <u>N.J.</u> at 508 (emphasis added).]

13 It is the Court's direction in <u>Abbott V</u> that the Commissioner 14 "ensure" and "assist" which has informed the Commissioner's 15 decision, and our affirmance of that decision, that other 16 resources, including funds existing at the district level, may 17 be allocated for these purposes.

In pursuing the difficult question put to us as to how we 18 19 should consider the Supreme Court's holding in Abbott V regarding the funding of preschool programs in the Abbott 20 districts, we further observe that we do not view the present 21 22 dispute as exalting the grammatical or syntactical form of the 23 Court's words over the substance of what the Court intended to Instead, in light of the Court's clarification of 24 convey. 25 Abbott V in Abbott v. Burke, 163 N.J. 95, 104 (2000) (Abbott 26 VI), we can rest assured that the Court meant precisely what it 27 the Court, i n clari fyi ng the Commissioner's said since 28 obligations, simply reiterated the passage from <u>Abbott V</u> which 29 we quoted above.

Accordingly, in answering the single question posed by this 1 appeal, we follow the Court's prior holdings and conclude that 2 the Court has only directed the Commissioner to "ensure" and 3 "assist" in the "adequate funding" of preschool programs in the 4 Abbott districts. We are satisfied that the Court's wording of 5 this obligation -- particularly when viewed against the Court's 6 7 determination not to declare that a preschool education is constitutionally mandated -- falls significantly short 8 of 9 requiring exclusive State funding for preschool programs in the Abbott districts.<sup>4</sup> 10

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IV

We also agree with the Commissioner that the Appropriations Act does not contain an obligation to fund any aspects of preschool education in the Abbott districts other than through the funding which comes from PSEA and ECPA. The Abbott districts argue that the Governor's 2004 Budget Message

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>We also reject the Abbott districts' contention that the following general comment made by the assistant commissioner, in a letter advising of various aspects of state funding, prohibited the Commissioner from rendering the decision now under review: "The state will meet its obligation to fully fund parity and preschool programs for Abbott districts." Much of what followed in that letter undercut the significance of this comment. Moreover, we fail to see how the Commissioner would be bound to comply with such a general statement in the particular context in which it was rendered.

illuminates the legislative intent to exclusively fund all 1 2 preschool aspects of whole-school reform. While we acknowledge 3 the of а governor may be considered in that comments ascertaining the intent underlying particular legislation, State 4 v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 483 (1993), we conclude that the 5 Appropriations Act which the Legislature ultimately enacted 6 7 deliberately limited the scope of funding which the Governor's message appears to have proposed. 8

9 In urging the significance of the Budget Message, 10 plaintiffs rely specifically upon the Governor's following 11 statement:

12 appropriated hereinabove The amount for 13 Additional Abbott v. Burke State Aid will additional resources 14 provi de to "Abbott 15 districts" to meet the State's obligation to fully fund parity and the approved early 16 childhood operational plans. 17

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[emphasis added.]

21 The legislation proposed at the time of the Governor's Budget 22 Message expressed in the same way the scope of funding available 23 for preschool education in Abbott districts. However. the 24 Legislature modified the relevant provision so that instead of 25 stating its intent to provide "additional resources . . . to meet the State's obligation to fully fund . . . the approved 26 early childhood operational plans," the Legislature stated that 27 it was providing "additional resources . . . to meet the State's 28

obligation to fully fund . . . <u>approved 'Abbott' preschool</u>
<u>expansion</u>." (emphasis added). This modification presents little
question but that the Legislature intended to limit State
funding to PSEA, ECPA and the funding for facilities remediation
and construction compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in
<u>Abbott v. Burke</u>, 164 <u>N. J.</u> 84, 88 (2000) (<u>Abbott VII</u>).

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appropriations Act does
not contain any provision for the State's exclusive funding of
all aspects of preschool education in the Abbott districts.

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12 Since the Supreme Court has not mandated exclusive State 13 funding for all aspects of preschool education in the Abbott 14 districts and since the Legislature has not provided for the 15 funding of preschool beyond the funding components of PSEA and ECPA, we agree with the Commissioner's determination that the 16 State is not mandated to exclusively fund preschool in the 17 Abbott districts and that local resources, if available, may be 18 19 allocated for such purposes.

20 Affirmed.